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The stagnation in the growth of traditional mission-oriented government research centers in 
Europe, together with privatization trends and the decreasing weight of government sector 
expenditures in R&D statistics, might lead to the view that public sector research is shrinking 
in many European countries. In this paper, we claim that, on the contrary, public sector-driven 
research in Europe is expanding in size and relevance. To understand this apparent paradox, 
we argue that it is essential to analyze the dynamics of creation and adaptation of research 
centers. We illustrate our case with empirical information about three types of research 
centers: technology centers, joint university centers, and newly-created centers. Both by 
adaptation strategies to evolving policy models, or by original design, these three 
organizational types have progressively occupied a middle place in the organizational field of 
research, with blurred boundaries in terms of public-private ownership, funding sources, and 
relative output orientation to local markets or to excellence in global science competition. 
Despite the increasing commonalities in functions, we do not find evidence to support claims 
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Long existing statistical evidence shows that the “public” sector of research is reducing 
its size in OECD countries (OECD, 1989); the government sector share of the total GERD has 
moved from an average 18% in 1980, to 11% in 2006 (OECD, 2008).   
In this paper we claim that there is evidence of a growing role of government 
intervention in research and innovation, reflected in the evolution of research institutes, 
despite the fact that the role of “government” as an R&D performer could have effectively 
diminished.  
There are diverse factors that should be taken into account. First, governments 
themselves - more and more of a supranational and sub-national character- have become new 
and very active players in some countries (Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz-Castro 2005). Second, 
governments in many countries are changing the forms of intervention from the traditional 
“block grant” funding system to a model based on competitive project funding or more 
strategic (performance based) funding (OECD, 2003). Third, in most European countries, 
universities (most of them public) have become the main “foci” of government action as 
regards support to research. Fourth, governments in many countries incentivate business R&D 
investments and address market failures in knowledge production supporting private 
institutions which provide knowledge, technology or services to firms. Increasing global 
competition has led governments to influence and mobilize these non public industrial 
research centers in support of their policies. Finally, there is substantive change in what 
governments demand from research institutions with more and more emphasis on the transfer, 
use and valorization of the knowledge they produce; a movement that others have labeled as 
the move from mode I to mode II (Gibbons et al. 1994). All these policy trends are reshaping 
the environment of research centers.  





Additionally, statistics do not account properly for the growth of government-promoted 
or government supported independent research institutes, many of them connected with 
universities or oriented to the market of research and knowledge services, such the Research 
and Technology Organizations (RTO). 
There is large empirical evidence of this growth from the United States (Crow, Bozeman 
and affiliates in the National Comparative R&D Laboratory Study Project, NCRDP) and from 
Europe (EUROLABS project, 2002). The EUROLABS project (almost 800 research centers -
public, semi-public or recently privatized-) provided evidence of significant dynamics in 
terms of creation of new entities: 45% had been created in the previous 20 years and not for 
profit foundations appear to be the dominant form of ownership for the centers included in the 
project in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Belgium.  
It is our contention that the aggregation of entities in three classificatory sectors 
(government, higher education and firms, and one residual sector for not for profit entities) 
precludes the appropriate measurement, description and understanding of three relevant 
processes of change among research actors and in the innovation systems: first, blurring 
boundaries between different entities in the field; second, the processes of functional 
convergence around common activities among different types of organizations; and third, the 
emergence of a new type of hybrid forms of research centers. 
Our purpose in this paper is to present evidence on the adaptation patterns and the 
evolution of research centers in the context of a general dynamic of blurring boundaries 
between public and private R&D sectors, the changing missions and activities of research 
institutes and the development of cooperation strategies among them. Our approach 
incorporates an institutional and organizational perspective, and tries to update some of the 
contributions made in the last years from different perspectives. We address the following 
questions: to what extent different types of research institutes are moving to a “semipublic” 





space, where there is room for both markets and political interactions? What are the driving 
forces behind these changes and why different types of research institutes move to a 
“common space”? And, to what extent, if a trend towards common functions really exists, can 
we detect processes of convergence in organizational and management models? 
Next section presents our analytical approach and some literature relevant to our case. In 
section three we describe the research design and we present the Spanish evidence. Next we 
discuss our findings and finally we conclude summarizing the implications for the future 
study of research centers and for policy. 
2. Analytical framework and literature review 
To guide our empirical analysis we borrow from different sets of literature: First, the 
R&D policy models or paradigms of government intervention; second, taxonomies of 
research institutes; and third, changes in public research institutes, some of them “policy 
induced” (such as privatization) and some other brought about by “adaptation” of research 
centers to changing environmental conditions, including the search for external funds, 
increasing technology transfer and commercialization.  
The first set of literature argues that research centers should be analyzed within their 
environments, being one of the most important environmental elements the dominance of a 
concrete S&T policy model, or the coexistence of more than one through the emergence of 
new forms of legitimation (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2007). 
Bozeman and Dietz (2003), drawing on previous research by Crow and Bozeman (1998), 
argued that US research policy has been dominated by three policy paradigms: “market 
failure”, “mission” and “cooperative”. More recently Boardman and Ponomariov (2008), 
drawing upon defense laboratories evidence, have suggested an elaboration of the three 





competing policy paradigms, bringing our attention to the fact that “cooperation” is becoming 
a substantive principle of all policy strategies both mission and non-mission. 
Our contribution in this paper to these debates is the identification of a new and emerging 
paradigm or rationale (evident in many European countries, but also in other parts of the 
world) with the key driver being “Excellence”. In the context of global competition for 
reputation, knowledge and people, governments have launched important initiatives to 
improve the performance of existing traditional R&D actors (universities or research centers)4 
or creating new ones.  
Crow, Emmert and Jacobson (1990), Bozeman and Crow (1990) and Crow and Bozeman 
(1998) developed an empirical “taxonomy”, with the objective of classifying the research 
laboratories under two dimensions: the degree of publicness and the economic character of 
the outputs, particularly the market or public characteristics. This taxonomy calls attention to 
the fact that “boundaries” between public and private organizations are more permeable than 
before. The term “publicness” was introduced to signal that political authority and control on 
political resources are exerted on all types of organizations with highly varying degrees as 
regards the role of government in setting or shaping the laboratory’s research agenda, the 
amount and share of government resources that come from government (via contracts, grants, 
subsidies, or other vehicles) and government control of the structure and design of the Labs; 
of course, publicness does not equate “government ownership”.  
The taxonomy and each of the quadrants (figure 1), allow us to think in the position of 
the research centre in a singular way and to describe the movements (under market and 
political forces) of the position of research institutes. 
Our argument is that there is a general trend for public and semi public research centers 
to move to the centre quadrant in the taxonomy, as a way to respond to the demands for the 
                                                 
4 For example the “Initiative for Excellence” from the German Government.  





transfer of knowledge and to gain strategic competencies and be more autonomous, with 
diversified sources of funding, to deal with both the market and the political environments. 
 
Figure 1.- Classification scheme for R&D organizations 
  Level of governmental influence 
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Source: Elaboration based on Crow, Emmert and Jacobson (1990). 
 
We argue that the non governmental industrial research institutes (lower left corner in 
figure 1) will have the tendency to move into the public sphere, searching for more public 
funding and aiming to build generic capabilities to deliver more “public technology”. In the 
opposite side, we expect to see movements of the traditional academic institutions, the 
traditional public research centers, to move –even in the absence of strong external policy 
shocks-  into the direction of “getting more private support” through the development of 
“problem solving” research strategies, in many occasions linked to excellence paradigms. 
Finally, change in public research institutes has been addressed in diverse ways after the 
seminal contributions of Crow & Bozeman, and still miss country comparative studies, 
because the usual products are collections of national studies (van der Meulen and Rip, 1994, 
Senker, 2000 or Cox et al. 2001).  
There have been studies determining the impact and relevance of science and technology 
policies on the configurations of public laboratories (Callon et al. 1992), the impact of 
policies on the orientation towards collaboration of public research centers with industry (Joly 
and Mangematin, 1996) or the changes in public sector research and their position in 
innovation systems (Larédo and Mustar, 2004). This work showed that the formal mission 





statement of the institutional affiliation did not determine the activity profiles of laboratories 
and the deep transformation of missions and functions of the traditional centers have made the 
distinctions between fundamental, applied or mission oriented research obsolete; the 
institutions of research are not any longer defined by a given type of research activity, but 
institutions focus on a given domain and cover the whole spectrum of research activities 
(Laredo, 2001).  
More recently, privatization processes or private managerial changes and their impact on 
public laboratories traditionally in the hands of government, have attracted the attention of 
scholars (Cohen, Duberley and McAuley, 1999; Boden et al. 2001, 2004, 2006). In addition to 
policy-induced changes there have also been “adaptation” dynamics of research centers to 
changing conditions, and reactions to environmental changes, including the search for 
external funds, increasing technology transfer and commercialization (Schimank and Stucke 
1994; Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz-Castro 2003). 
Other relevant literature refers to the management of collaborations, for example in new 
university research centers (Bozeman and Boardman, 2003, Corley, Boardman and Bozeman, 
2006; Cummings and Kiesler, 2007) or the consequences of changes for the management or 
collaboration (Rogers and Bozeman 1997). For instance Liyanage and Mitchell (1993) have 
worked on the management and decision making process. They identify three different 
management styles emerging in the Australian Cooperative Research centers (CRC): 
“corporate”, “research” and “integrated”, while there are also three different “decision-
making models: an “executive control model” with a strong line of decision filtration, 
command and control; an “consensus model” where decision are made in consultation with 
several organizational layers of managers and key partners; and “authoritative model”, 
dominant an academic research, based on direct control of the executive director over 





decision-making with is only counterbalanced by advisory committees. We make use of some 
of these categories to analyze our cases.  
3. Similar dynamics in diverse types of research centers  
Research centers or institutes are entities conducting research and development as the 
central part of their missions. We acknowledge that direct ownership or control by 
governments is not any longer a core feature of many research institutes, especially those that 
have been promoted or created recently. 
In the EUROLABS project (2002) Spain appeared as the most dynamic country in the 
creation of research centers and that in which most of the new centers, despite their variety of 
missions (industrial research or academic problem-solving) and promoters (governments or 
other actors) had taken the form of “semi-public” not-for profit entities. Additionally Spain, 
despite its low starting level of expenditure in R&D, has had the highest growth rate in R&D 
expenditure of OECD countries in the last 5 years, as well as the highest growth rate in public 
budgets for R&D (OECD, 2008) and new political actors in R&D policy: the regional 
authorities (Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz-Castro, 2005).  
For the purpose of building our case we have identified three types of research institutes 
that provide evidence and insights of the dynamics we would like to illustrate. The first group 
is the “technology centers”, a category of private not for profit institutes doing industrial and 
technological research. The second group is the “Joint CSIC-Universities centers”. The CSIC 
is the biggest entity performing research and development in Spain. CSIC institutes can be 
CSIC-only or joint institutes built up in agreement with other institutions, mainly universities. 
The third group of research institutes is much more diverse and although it may not be as 
coherent as a group as the previous two, most of the centers included in this group have four 
common traits: they have been recently created; they have taken the legal form of not for 





profit foundation; they have often had some form of government involvement in their 
inception; and in many occasions they involve existing research organizations or institutions 
willing to escape from the lack of flexibility in the classical “public” domain for managing 
research with international standards (see table 1).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 –about here- 
The data and information we have collected is quite diverse, which had led us to take 
different methodological approaches. First, for the three groups, we have extensively used 
secondary information and reports of the activities of the Institutes and centers. Secondly, for 
the group of technology centers we have used a database provided by FEDIT, the Spanish 
association of Technological Centers, containing diverse indicators of the evolution of its 
members during the last 5 years. Finally, for the analysis of the CSIC joint research centers, 
CNIO and some technology centers we have used qualitative information coming from in-
depth interviews with researchers and managers. More details are given in each of the 
subsections.  
3.1 Technology Centers 
Spanish technology centers are non-for-profit organizations doing applied technological 
R&D, funded from both public and private sources and have the mission to support Spanish 
firms, facilitating technology transfer and the adoption of innovative practices and new 
technologies in traditional sectors, which tend to be populated with SMEs. They are relevant 
for this paper because, first, they are one of the growing populations in the field of semi-
public research centers, second, they illustrate forms of governance structures with both 
public and private involvement, and third, they have strategically diversified their funding 
sources, in order to reduce dependency from R&D contracts with industry and build their own 
R&D capacities. 





More than 60 new technology centers were created between 1981 and 2006, only 15 
existed before 1980. Although in some cases their creation responded to private initiatives, 
they were often supported or even directly promoted by regional governments who saw in 
them a good instrument to foster technology-based innovation in SMEs (Moso and Olazarán 
2002). The central government has influenced their evolution through approving a regulatory 
frame5 that allow them to participate in competitive R&D funding calls previously confined to 
universities or public research centers. 
During many years the proximity to business clients provided technology centers with 
some advantage for technology transfer services. However, the situation changed at the end of 
the 1980s, when universities and public research centers begun to provide research and 
technology services to the market and to compete with technology centers for clients. At the 
same time some regional governments started to put more emphasis on the support to 
universities than before. Technology centers encountered a new situation where they had less 
stable resources and faced more competition for funds. On the one hand, the level of 
excellence required when competing for public funds for projects could be too high for them, 
as they were often evaluated by academic criteria. On the other hand, they would face more 
uncertainty if they relied only on contracts as a strategy for growth, as service demands by 
firms tends to be more unpredictable than generic R&D, provide less scope for re-utilization 
in other projects, and may come with intellectual property restrictions.  
Acknowledging that contract R&D would always have to represent an important part of 
their activities, some of the technology centers took the strategic decision to change priorities 
and started to invest more in own R&D projects than in other types of activities; to finance 
their “own” R&D they needed to increase their level of public funding. 
                                                 
5 The central government created a national registry for technology centres in 1996. 





In 2002, the FEDIT approved its Strategic Plan for 2002-2006, and set objectives on the 
transformation needed. The trade-off faced by technology centers if they wanted to move 
from a client-based model focused on R&D-on-demand model towards a generic R&D 
model, providing advanced technological services to firms, was clearly stated: “Technology 
centers should avoid to focus too much on clients, as this would lead to a loss of technological 
capacity, jeopardizing a sustainable future. On the other hand, a strong bid for basic 
research, although oriented, can break their connection with the productive sector and make 
them lose efficiency as technological bridges”6. Key to the change of strategy was also the 
need to reach international markets and build capacities to be able to play on the same field as 
European counterparts such as TNO, FhG and VTT, which not only are much larger 
organizations but also count with stronger direct financial support from central governments 
than Spanish technology centers that do nota have more than 25% of their total income. 
Consistent with the strategic decision to move towards more generic R&D, in 2004, 
FEDIT introduced a number of new conditions to become a member: First, to have a 
sufficient number of qualified staff; second, to have a sufficiently high and stable total 
income; third, not too dependent from public sector (non-competitive funding below 30% of 
total annual budget); and fourth to devote more than 25% of total annual budget for R&D and 
innovation activities. 
The evolution of technology centers along different dimensions between 2002 and 2007 
clearly indicates the impact of the decisions made.7 First, in relation to the direct connection 
with firms the share of business representatives in technological centers governing bodies has 
diminished (77% in 2003 to 70% in 2007), whereas the representation of universities and 
public research centers has increased (3% to 5% for universities; 1% to 2% for public research 
                                                 
6 Report from the Director General, Iñigo Segura, FEDIT Annual Report 2002. 
7 Based on aggregated information on technology centres associated to FEDIT. We thank FEDIT for having 
provided us with these data. 





centers). Second, the share of employees holding a PhD has passed from 8% to 10%, and that 
of employees with a university degree from 45% to 51%, which indicates a shift in the 
composition of staff towards more qualified personnel more adapted for the new mission and 
functions. Third, public competitive funds have increased as a share of total income from 29% 
in 2002 to 33% in 2007, whereas public non-competitive funding has been reduced from 14% 
to 10% during the same period, as it has been the case for public/private R&D contracts, from 
57% to 50%. This reflects the increasing importance of generic R&D, which is mainly funded 
from public competitive funds (FEDIT, 2004). When looking at the evolution of the average 
income by technology centre broken down by type of activity the shift of priorities from 
business R&D contracts towards own R&D becomes even clearer. The income dedicated to 
own R&D projects has increased both as a share of total income and in absolute terms, 
whereas the share of business R&D contracts has decreased relatively to total income.  
Adding to our argument that public investments are not shrinking, it is worth noting that 
the shifts to generic R&D and more qualified staff have been largely supported with public 
competitive funds, as own R&D projects are predominantly funded through public 
competitive calls and the cost of hiring PhDs and engineers has often been shared with the 
central government through programs to foster the integration of PhDs in the business sector. 
Finally, another strategic objective, but more difficult to implement, was to increase the 
critical mass of research groups with the aim to have more chances to compete with other 
research and technology organizations in Europe in the international market for competitive 
funds, mainly European Framework Programme.8 To date, there has been one successful 
attempt, although still on progress: Tecnalia, the technological corporation born in 2001 
integrating three Basque technology centers that now has seven (Rico, 2007). 
                                                 
8 Spanish technology centres concentrate around 9% of the total return from the EU Framework Programme for 
Spain (Callejón et al. 2007). 





The rationale for creating Tecnalia was to become a corporation able to participate in 
the most advanced international research lines. It can also be seen as a move to increase the 
chances to compete successfully with the much larger European research and technology 
organizations. The technology centers affiliated to Tecnalia seem to have more staff and a 
higher share of qualified employees than the average technology center, with also almost 
twice as many employees with PhDs and bachelor and engineering degrees.9  
In their origins the management model of technology centers was very much determined 
by their nature as former industrial associations and by their core mission of providing their 
affiliates firms with services on demand. Accordingly, the management structures of 
technology centers have always had a significant level of representation from the industrial 
and business sector, and research priorities, very much oriented to industrial applications, 
were drawn either from sectors’ interests or following enterprises’ demands. Therefore, the 
decisions of the basic orientation of the center were taken by the board, and filtered down to 
the working units. Longer term research planning or training components were poorly 
reflected in the organizational structure as compared to the commercial function. 
As we have seen, technology centers have confronted challenges and changes in recent 
years that have affected their management modes. Governing boards have been enlarged to 
include more regional representatives with broader interests in the socioeconomic relevance 
of the work of the centers for the region. It is clear from the annual reports and some 
qualitative information gathered through interviews that more and more, research planning 
and agendas in technology centers are built up over two different temporal frameworks and 
two levels of decision making. While most centers have kept the short-term projects 
addressing firms’ needs through contract research, some of them have also enlarged their 
functions to include the development of medium-term generic projects and training of 
                                                 
9 Own calculations based on information from Tecnalia members annual reports and FEDIT database. 





researchers. Decisions about this second type of research are mostly taken at the top 
management level, but following consultation processes with several organization layers of 
managers and working units reflecting a consensus-based approach to decisions about lines of 
research. 
3.2. CSIC-University Joint Research Centers 
CSIC is the largest public performing research institution in Spain; it exists since 1939 
and is similar to the Max Planck Society in Germany or the CNRS in France. It covers all 
scientific domains and performs basic and applied research. It has almost 130 institutes, of 
which 49 are joint centers.  Joint centers are research centers in which the ownership is shared 
between the CSIC and another institution. Half of them are in the biology and biomedicine 
areas or in physics.  
In this section we focus on those that involve agreements between the CSIC and 
universities10: there are 43. CSIC-university joint centers are institutional arrangements that 
bring together researchers from a CSIC institute and faculty from one or several departments 
of a single university. Their infrastructures are located in the university campus in the 
majority of the cases.  
Joint centers are relevant for the arguments of this paper for several reasons. Firstly, they 
constitute one example of the blurring boundaries in the organizational field of public 
research. In that sense, at their origin they represented an institutional innovation in the 
university environment, traditionally organized across departments and schools; at the same 
time, they illustrate the adaptive movement of a classical PRC towards spaces of collaboration 
with other public actors in response to evolving policy models. Secondly, they provide 
examples of how institutionalized collaboration facilitates the diffusion of organizational 
                                                 
10 The regional government of the territory in which the university is located usually participates in the 
agreement too. 





practices. Finally, the growth of joint centers between universities and public research centers 
is part of a larger European dynamic.  
Research groups are mixed in their composition and directorship is also shared. 
However, university faculty keeps their teaching duties at the schools and departments, 
whereas in the CSIC, tenured researchers are full-time scientists without such obligation. The 
CSIC is the only public research centre with similar career structures as that of universities. 
Joint centers staff remain employees of their own institution, and tenured positions are offered 
not by the joint centers but by each of the partner institutions, that maintain control over 
recruitment, promotions or leaves. This is likely to diminish the level of integration and 
institutional identity, but, at the same time, reduces the potential conflict between the centers 
and the departments over staff time, and reduces the chances of academics’ conflict of roles. 
Thus, if some kind of isomorphism takes place among the two parts, it is driven by diffusion 
of practices rather than by strategic managerial decisions. 
Their infrastructure is funded by a collaboration agreement between the CSIC and the 
university, and therefore, they do not have to compete with departments for university internal 
funds. Since neither universities nor the CSIC fund their institutes or departments with block 
grant funds for research, the standard mechanism for funding research activities is through 
researchers applying for grants to competitive sources, or engaging in contracts with industry. 
Joint centers originated in the seventies and expanded from the mid eighties onwards. 
CSIC newly-created centers have predominantly been joint centers; in the period 1980-1999 
they represented the 52%, while since 2000 they represented the 78% of the centers created. 
Two main factors account for this. First, regional governments have promoted the creation of 
research centers in their territories; the local universities have been the natural institutional 
context for these developments. Universities have seen in the creation of these structures 
adjunct to departments a mechanism to foster research in areas in which they had strong 





capacities. Secondly, the CSIC has adapted to the increasing role and weight of the university 
sector compared to the governmental sector in the overall R&D spending and the greater 
degree of competition for resources involved in this trend.  
Although joint centers have represented an institutional innovation, it must be 
acknowledged that the risk involved in these cooperative ventures has been very modest, and 
that partners have been rather conservative. One the one hand, they have kept the highest 
degree of autonomy in employment decisions, one of the key assets of public research 
institutions, and staff scales have never been integrated. The majority of research staff in these 
centers has either academic or scientific tenure, positions which in Spain are granted with 
civil servant status, and therefore life-long employment, even in the remote case that centers 
or departments are closed.  On the other hand, by its very nature, it is not expected that joint 
centers have a self-financing strategy, so the perceived pressure to compete in the markets for 
public competitive or private funding, is not higher than in the rest of the university 
departments or CSIC own institutes. Joint centers have existed for decades now and they have 
not evolved as something more or different than the sum of two parts. They are better 
understood as coalitions coming from classical research structures that, in the absence of 
strong managerial strategic approaches, have run in parallel to dynamics in their mother 
institutions.  
The qualitative empirical evidence that follows comes from a study of 25 university 
departments, five of them belonging to a joint research centre with the CSIC11. We tried to 
address the questions of whether joint centers had staffing policies different from those in  
traditional academic departments, and the extent to which joint centers have been able to 
                                                 
11 We conducted more than one hundred in depth interviews addressing a variety of issues related with the 
management of research and the dynamics of academic and research careers. In these five departments (3 from 
physics, one from biology and another from chemistry) we conducted 20 interviews, 4 with department directors, 
5 with directors of research groups, 4 with other tenured academic staff, and 7 with non-permanent academic 
staff. 





developed a top-down strategic approach in which the management and planning is above the 
research and education functions in the organizational structural. 
In a national context in which universities are rather resistant to change and reform, we 
have found evidence that joint centers entail dynamics of diffusion. University departments 
involved in joint centers have been influenced by CSIC practices and developments. We have 
identified two dynamics at the micro level. 
The first one is related to research careers and criteria for recruitment. University 
academic appointments in Spain have traditionally followed internal labor markets dynamics 
by which a PhD degree awarded by the hiring department and prior teaching positions within 
it, have played a key role in selection processes for tenure. At the beginning of this decade, 
the central government launched the Ramon y Cajal program. It was designed to provide 
subsidies to PRCs and universities for contracting full-time researchers for 5 years in priority 
or strategic fields (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menendez, 2005).  
One of the key findings arising from the interviews is that these contracts have had a 
significant impact on changing the traditional implicit rules of university recruitment in the 
last years. These researchers (approx 3.500) have been granted with a reputation of good 
quality and excellence, and contracting organizations have committed to provide tenure or 
fixed employment opportunities at the end of the five-year period. This has introduced an 
unknown level of competition in the internal queues of the departments and often some 
degree conflict.  
CSIC-universities joint centers (and departments attached to them) have made a 
significant use of Ramon y Cajal postdoctoral contracts, but most importantly, what is 
distinctive is that they have clearly adopted this contractual figure as a form of tenure track 
appointment, so that it has become the principal route of entering departments as new tenured 
or permanent faculty.  





The early career path in these centers is more explicit than it is perceived by interviewees 
from university departments in general. Emphasis on internationalization of research, mobility 
and scientific productivity in joint centers is noticeable irrespectively of the scientific or 
technical field. Postdoctoral researchers in joint centers perceive that common socialization 
norms open the possibility of opportunities in employment ladders in the two sides, the 
department and the CSIC. This is not the case in traditional CSIC institutes or university 
departments, where the labor markets are more segmented.  
The second diffusion dynamic relates to the systematic adoption of evaluation as a 
managerial practice. The CSIC was transformed into a public agency in 2007. This reform 
implied that it would be financed on the basis of a contractual agreement with the Ministry of 
Finance. The conversion into an agency involved the request, for all CSIC centers and 
institutes, to periodically elaborate a four-year strategic plan, subjected to external peer 
review. Interestingly, although university academic staff in joint centers was not requested to 
participate in those research evaluation exercises, however, some of these departments 
decided to evaluate themselves in parallel. It must be said, however, that these decisions were 
taken at the micro level of the departments and research groups, and did not imply a 
managerial strategy at the center level and had no distributive consequences. 
In sum, university departments in joint centers show clearer career expectations and 
paths for new recruits, and put greater emphasis on internationalization and mobility for those 
at the beginning of their careers. After tenure, however, there is not a strong culture of 
individual evaluation performance. Joint centers do not show a distinctive management style 
different from their institutions of origin. They keep a bottom up management style with 
emphasis on individual researchers that enjoy high degrees of autonomy (Sanz-Menéndez and 
Cruz-Castro, 2003). As a consequence, goal setting is the result of the aggregation of 
individual and research groups research agendas, rather than based on highly structured 





research programs. Commercialization of research varies depending on the area but it is also 
the outcome of the aggregation of the market orientation of the groups rather than an 
organizational objective. We have not identified a management and planning function in the 
organizational tree. In that sense, joint centers have inherited the limitations of their partner 
organizations, and have not so far turned to be the institutional solution to the endemic 
collective action problems that have historically affected universities and the CSIC. 
3.3. Excellence oriented newly-created research centers: “unlimited by design” 
We have been arguing that governments have changed the way they intervene in the 
production and promotion of research. The new centers are very different from the traditional 
government laboratories that flourished decades ago and which were the main instrument of 
the government sector as an R&D performer. These new centers hardly fit in the traditional 
policy paradigms around market failure, mission or cooperative policy models; it is our 
contention that they represent one key example of what might be called the “search for 
excellence” paradigm, articulated around policies that aim at enhancing quality, scale, 
productivity and internationalization of research and around competitive funding and 
corporate human resources management instruments. 
In Spain, we find a number of key examples in this domain, some of them related to 
actions of the national Government and some others from initiatives sponsored by regional 
governments. The first is a set of centers created by the Ministry of Health to carry out 
research with the highest scientific standards, but aiming to contribute to the solution of 
problems. Among the second set there is a group of the research centers created under the 
support of the regional government of Catalonia, a region in the northeast of Spain.  
At the end of the nineties, the Ministry of Health issued a strategic Plan that included the 
creation of three research centers to conduct research in high priority areas (cancer, heart, and 
degenerative diseases). They were created under the legal form of private not for profit 





foundations. They get a significant part of their funding from public sources, but also from 
business and other private sources. They were designed to break away the administrative and 
organizational limitations and rigidities of the Spanish PRC management model in terms of 
contracting, staffing, funding and management capacities. They are characterized by a 
management style sharply different from that of the PRC that created them.  
The National Center for Oncology Research (CNIO) is particularly interesting. It was 
created in 1998 by the Carlos III Health Institute, a classical PRC. The CNIO is managed by a 
foundation, created simultaneously with the CNIO, named Carlos III Foundation CNIO. The 
Foundation is owned by the Government, but it is subject to the private law and it has a 
governing board. The Center is in charge of developing the scientific activity and it has a 
Director that works with the advice of a Scientific Advisory Committee. The criteria for the 
selection of the Director followed, in 1998, was his worldwide scientific reputation in the 
field. The selected Director12 is still in office.  
The number of employees of the centre has grown from 94 in 2000 to 457 in 2007, the 
majority of them being researchers. Its essential mission is to conduct research of excellence 
and to transfer the very latest technology in the field of cancer to the Spanish National Health 
System and to innovative companies. The CNIO is one of the few European Cancer Centers 
to allocate resources to both basic and applied research in an integrated fashion, thus 
supporting the interaction of basic research programs with those of molecular diagnostics and 
drug discover. 
The CNIO continues to be a “public” or more precisely “semi-public” institution, with 
about 50 percent of its budget coming as “hard money” from the government through direct 
transfers, while the other 50 percent comes from grants (either public or private).  
                                                 
12 Mariano Barbacid, the head of CNIO, was appointed after having worked in the United States for 23 years. 
The selection of the Director of the CNIC (cardiovascular research) has followed similar patterns and Valentin 
Fuster was appointed in 2004 after returning from the Mont Sinai School of Medicine in New York. 





CNIO is relevant for the arguments of this paper because it represents an example of a 
newly created centre, designed, from its origin, to be a center of excellence, and to have the 
greatest degree of autonomy and flexibility, to compete in the market of knowledge 
production and transfer, which is more and more international. The way in which 
management operates at CNIO reflects the flexibility associated with a private organization, 
derived from its foundation nature. As a center the CNIO has the advantage of being 
autonomous in terms of strategic planning and daily operations13. 
CNIO management features include high degrees of flexibility and capacity to contract 
external services, to recruit researchers nationally and internationally, to pay competitive 
salaries, and to raise private funds in the forms of donations. Changing recruitment and 
staffing policies was an essential element of the new centre. The first movement was to attract 
Spanish researchers working at foreign research institutions14. 
CNIO employees are not civil servants, a status which requires passing exams, being EU 
national and diploma homologations. Not having civil servant status gives CNIO tremendous 
flexibility in hiring scientists from all over the world and to avoid the salary rigidities 
associated to public employment. Staff scientists have been recruited internationally and they 
have been given the chance to bring part of their team with them. Promotion does not follow 
the traditional rules of academic labor markets or the public sector research in Spain. There is 
a target to increase the share of foreigners at CNIO, but currently 25 percent of the CNIO's 
postdocs and graduate students are foreign, as are five of the 35 group leaders.  
CNIO is organized along seven research programs each of which has one director and 
several research groups headed by a senior scientist. There are almost forty different research 
groups of a small average size of around ten people. 80% of CNIO’s personnel are under the 
                                                 
13 "That is something the other research centers cannot do; they have to ask for permission for everything either 
to the [Spanish] research council or to the university" (Barbacid, 2008). 
14 The key element was a good startup package to attract the best people. "We give them three [support] 
positions, and everything they need for the first three years, within reason" (Barbacid, 2008) 





age of 40. Apart from group leaders, the other categories are staff scientists, postdoctoral 
fellows, graduate students and technicians.  
CNIO model represents a radical departure from the past as regards the operation 
conditions of a research centre in Spain. While having a significant amount of public support, 
it also has the flexibility of private research centers as regards general management. The 
managerial mode, with a scientific leader as Director, building a joint organizational strategy, 
is a departure from the standard way of operation in the traditional academic world in Spain, 
which resembles a confederation of very small groups or individual researchers acting 
independently and without any incentive or authority to cooperate beyond the expectation to 
get more resources from the environment.  
Our second set of examples of newly created “public or semi public” research centers 
comes from the region of Catalonia, around an initiative called “Research Centers of 
Catalonia (CEREC)”. The forms adopted by the new independent Institutes have evolved over 
the years: they started as networking of existing institutions to pool resources, but still 
keeping separate staffing policies; they ended up promoting complete independent research 
institutes with exclusive competence on the recruitment and staffing policy.  
Those created in the early nineties usually took the form of “consortium” of Institutions 
usually involving the regional Government and some universities; in fact the early model was 
quite similar to the CSIC Joint research centers15. Their activities were mostly the result of 
aggregating the activities of the partners, and in some cases, they could have a common 
agenda; the target was mainly to get the recognition and the explicit financial support of the 
Regional Government. 
                                                 
15 An archetype could be the IFAE (Institute of High Energy Physics). 





In a second move, some years later, the new centers have started to take the form of 
independent not for profit foundations16, but affiliated institutions still contributed with their 
own independent staff; in that way the Institutes usually lacked a joint policy of human 
resources, but the selection of the Directors started to be related with the highest reputation 
pattern. 
Most of this new generation of Catalan centers have taken an approach based on their 
“own recruitment” rather than on the “aggregation of the human resources of the different 
partners in a joint facilities” as it was previously the standard. This group is a much more 
evolved example of the research centers promoted under the “excellence” paradigm17: a key 
aspect of the management in this type of centre is performance evaluation. 
These Centers have escaped from the civil servant model; research staff is employed on a 
contractual basis; recruitment of the head of the research groups is international, and support 
depends on performance evaluations made by a Scientific Advisory Boards, usually 
composed by world leaders of research; some of then additionally have created “Industry 
Advisory Councils”, involving industry leaders in their fields of interest as a way of attracting 
private users and funding. 
This new type of centers, designed to reduce limitations, are a radical departure from the 
traditional model of Management of the Research Centers and universities, in which 
evaluation practices are not extended and, most importantly, do not entail strong salary or 
career consequences for scientists, once they enjoy a permanent employment. Also the 
selection process of the Directors is mainly based in scientific reputations. Research Agendas 
in these centers appear not to be any longer a bottom up process of aggregation, but a much 
                                                 
16 Archetypes of these centers were for example the IDIBAPS (Institute for Biomedical Research “Augusto Pi 
Suñer”) or the IEEC (Catalonian Institute for Space Studies). 
17 Archetypes of the new generation are: CRG (Centre for Genomic Regulation), ICFO (Institute of Photonic 
Sciences), IBEC (Institute for Bioengineering of Catalonia) or IRB (Institute for Research in Biomedicine). 





more “consensual” mode of strategic planning with a strong component of authoritative 
decision- making. 
4. Discussion 
The empirical evidence we have presented has shown that different types of research 
centers have confronted changes in their environments and have developed common 
processes of adaptation and change, with similar strategies and moved into a “semipublic 
space”, despite coming from locations more at the extremes in the different taxonomies. They 
all show a tendency to diversify their funding sources, enlarge their functions (we have found 
research, transfer and training in all of them), and engage in cooperative ventures. The key 
drivers behind these movements are the changing policy models at all levels of government, 
favoring excellence, cooperation, transfer and problem-oriented research, and the 
corresponding change in the funding instruments, which have increased the level of 
competition in the research markets, local, national and global. However, the extent to which 
these processes have implied convergence in organizational forms and managerial models is 
rather low.  
The case of the technology centers shows the evolution of formally “private” industrial 
research institutes into a much more “public sphere”. Technology centers individually through 
changes in their funding patterns, and by collective action through their association, have 
made movements: to become more public (getting more stable public funding and involving 
more policy makers into their governance bodies) to increase their R&D basic capabilities and 
qualification profiles, and to develop more strategic long-term approaches. Our account of the 
factors behind these changes point, primarily, to the perceived need to change to become 
more independent from the regional resources and direct clients and to grow in order to 
compete for European funds with other European technology centers. The diffusion of models 





of similar centers’ collective strategies across Europe has also played a role. Technology 
centers have corporate management features and, increasingly, decision making approaches 
combining executive features with consultation within the organizational layers. 
The creation of Joint CSIC-universities centers illustrates that also traditional public 
research centers respond to the changing environment and enter in general patterns of 
cooperation with other traditional actors, such as universities. Joint centers evidence   blurring 
institutional boundaries, and entail the set up of permanent cooperation schemes in scientific 
areas where resources needed to conduct research are large. We have identified two main 
drivers: on the one hand the willingness, on the part of both partners, to respond to the 
regional government demands to construct capacities in particular areas. For the institutions, 
the creation of a new center, and the start-up block grant involved in the initial investment, 
was seen as a growing opportunity; on the other hand, joining forces imply foreseen 
opportunities to gain visibility, size and critical mass to compete in the markets for project 
funding, both in basic and applied research. We have found some degree of 
internationalization and dynamism in these centers, especially as regards the management of 
early research careers. However, we have argued that the simple movement of joining forces 
–in the absence of the creation of new organizational identities, or the use of new legal forms- 
has been a rather conservative move which has not solved the limitations of the managerial 
academic research model of the partner institutions, especially as regards the lack of strategic 
planning, and the absence of flexible staff policies based on contracts, incentives and 
performance, and not in the civil servant model of research careers .  
The newly created research centers we have studied have been promoted under a new 
S&T paradigm (excellence). Their creation demonstrate that governments’ intervention, far 
from diminishing, is intensifying, but under “private forms” or using “private means”. This 
set of new research centers promoted either by national or regional governments have 





consolidated in the last ten years, in the context of a policy movement to a more “problem-
solving research” and excellence, and entail important changes in the map of actors. This 
group of centers has adopted integrated managerial styles combining consensus and more 
authoritative decision making elements, and research programming is usually located at the 
top level of the organization, occupied by a chief scientist. They have been designed, from its 
inception, to be located in a middle place as regards ownership, governance and orientation. 
These new centers may be also understood and explained in the context of adaptation 
strategies of existing actors, because they often involve traditional research actors such as 
universities or classical PRCs. Even when considering the emergence of new research centers 
under the policy impetus of regional governments we should look at this creation as a way of 
adaptation of the partners (usually universities and traditional research centers) to cope with 
the rigidities and the lack of ability to change themselves from within and to move across the 
paradigms.  
The comparison between these new centers and joint centers is revealing. They represent 
two very different choices of the traditional actors to become involved or cooperate. 
Cooperative efforts between universities and the CSIC, in the form joint research centers is a 
low risk venture, where the main results have been economies of scale and enlarged critical 
size, with poor results in terms of strategic planning capacities or flexible staff management. 
However, when the traditional actors join into the political initiatives of creation of new 
centers, with an independent legal status, and under the form of not for profit foundation, 
there is more than just the effects of economies of scale. This type of centers has adopted a 
management model without the rigidities of public service, and thus they enjoy contracting 
and recruiting flexibility.  The decision to become involved in a legally independent new 
center, however entail greater risks for the original institutions, which loose control over 
employment policy and organizational growth; although strongly publicly supported, newly 





created centers have to prove to be self-sustainable and competitive. In that sense, as a 
population of centers, they are likely face similar challenges as technology centers.  
5. To conclude: some implications 
On the theoretical ground our findings imply that future studies of the research and 
technology centers should not take organizational convergence for granted, even in the 
context of common challenges and opportunities. Additionally, further attempts to develop 
comparative analysis of policy models might benefit from the inclusion of rationales related 
to the search for excellence in global competition. We have also suggested that the 
“cooperative” model could also be connected with the “market failure” model. For instance, 
some of the traditional models of “industrial research associations” and the support that 
government have provided to them could be considered as part of one way of government 
intervention to solve “market failures”, helping with the provision and transfer of knowledge 
and technological services to SMEs and to some sectors that have difficulties to access 
technology. In this case, policy action to cope with “market failure” could also take the 
“cooperative” form, especially when “semi public” research institutes are involved. 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from our cases. First, research centers 
have moved to a semi-public common space partially in response to incentives built in 
policies. However, these incentives have not been able to favor cooperation among different 
types of centers. Further sophistication of policies would be needed to encourage centers to 
move beyond non-cooperative competition for the same resources. Second, 
internationalization of research as a policy target might require instruments that release 
organizations from their institutional constraints and allow them to build strategic 
management capacities. Finally, our cases indicate that the key catalyser for change is the 
breakup, by reform or by design, with public employment rules in research careers.  





Given the limitations of cases’ analysis, many important questions remain to be solved. 
Some of them relate to the construction of comparable indicators of the performance of the 
different types of centers. Although we can formulate normative hypothesis about the 
superiority of some management features and the flexibility associated with them, we do not 
know if different models and decision making rules lead to higher scientific and technical 
productivity, visibility or transfer (commercialization or other). This type of questions can 
only be addressed at the technical area or scientific field level of analysis. In fact, disciplinary 
differences are another issue to be explored and whether the dynamics we have identified 
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Table 1. Key attributes for the comparison of Research Centers 
 
Features Technology Centers Joint CSIC-university centers Not for profit research new centers 
Nature Non for profit organizations Public centers Not for profit foundations 
Total number More than 70 More than 40 More than 15 
Created since 1980 90% 85% 100% 
Promoters/creators Industrial research associations and 
regional government 
CSIC individual laboratories and 
university departments 
National and regional governments 
Independent legal 
status 
Yes No Yes 
Mission Support innovation and improve 
competitiveness of firms, mainly 
SMEs 
Conduct of research non mission 
oriented 
Conduct of research mainly problem-
solving 













Nature of R&D Private technology Public science Public science 
Management type Corporate Research/academic Integrated 
Decision making Executive Consensus Authoritative 
Employment 
conditions 
Private law, competitive salaries for 
regional business market 
Public Employee Law, civil servant 
status, salaries fixed, low for 
international academic standards 
Private law, competitive salaries for 
international academic standards 
Sources for funds Mixed - mainly private Mixed - mainly public Mixed - mainly public 
Pressure to get 
external funds 
Very high Medium High 
Public funds Competitive and direct subsidies  Competitive and block grant for running 
costs 
Competitive and non-earmarked block 
grants  
Private funds Company quotas, R&D and service 
contracts 
Private R&D contracts Private grants and donations 




Strategic planning Yes No Yes 
Industry involvement Very high (board, membership, 
contracts, clients, etc) 
Very low (contracts) Medium (sponsorship, and some with 
Industria Advisory Boards) 
Directorship Manager, often a senior engineer 
with business experience 
 
Academic, internal appointment from 
staff  




Very few Some of them All 
Source: Own elaboration. 
